ABSTRACT The recent increasing evolution of renewable energy technologies makes it possible for common residents to afford the cost of installing renewable energy devices (REDs) and energy storage systems (ESSs) in their own houses. With the prevalence of REDs and ESSs, it is a beneficial and also promising idea for residents in a community to share extra energy with others, especially, when they have different electricity usage patterns. However, considering the unpredictable energy usage patterns, radically intermittent characteristics of renewable energy generation, and dynamic electricity price, it would be difficult for residents in a community to intelligently share their energy with others and thus minimize the overall cost of the whole community. In this paper, we design an online algorithm, which can tackle costaware energy sharing among residents in a cooperative community. We formulate the problem as a stochastic constrained problem and the objective is to minimize the time-average cost in the whole community, which includes the cost of purchasing electricity from the main grid, and the cost of charging and discharging ESSs. By exploiting the dynamics of electricity price, we can determine the charging and discharging behaviors of ESSs. We explore our method based on the Lyapunov optimization theory, which does not need any future statistics and possesses low computational complexity. Through theoretical analysis of our algorithm, we can conclude that our strategy can approximate the optimality with provable bounds. Meanwhile, we design a revenue division algorithm based on the Nash bargaining theory to fairly share the revenue among residents. We also conduct extensive trace-driven simulations and results show that our algorithm can obtain nearly 12% of cost reduction for the community when compared with noncooperative algorithms, and ensure the fairness among residents in the meanwhile.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the dropping price of renewable energy devices (REDs) in recent years, it becomes affordable for many residents to install REDs (e.g., solar panel, wind turbine) in their houses [1] , which can greatly reduce the cost of electricity usage for residents. In such a smart grid-powered community, residents are able to generate and consume energy simultaneously. However, it is a challenging problem to handle the mismatch between residential energy usage and renewable energy generation. For example, the peak hours of residential electricity usage are in the morning or evening, while the peak hours of solar energy generation are normally in the noon.
Fortunately, the energy storage systems (ESSs) [2] , [3] provide the opportunity to store redundant electricity for future usage. For residential residents, it provides them a strategy to dynamically determine the charging and discharging behaviors of ESSs. For example, residents can charge the ESSs when there exists surplus energy and discharge the ESSs in the peak hours. Such charging and discharging operations can reduce the electricity cost for residents. Previous studies (e.g., [3] - [5] ) considered the usage of ESSs to alleviate the gap between the energy generation and consumption.
Consider a residential community (as shown in Fig. 1 ), in which each resident owns an ESS (e.g., battery) and a set of renewable energy generators (e.g., wind turbines or solar panels). When the residential load cannot be met by the supply from the ESS and renewable energy, the resident should draw extra electricity from his neighbors or the main grid. Due to the difference of electricity usage patterns among residents, it is possible for residents to achieve further cost reduction by cooperative energy sharing. However, there is very limited work to exploit the variety of electricity usage patterns for energy sharing among residents, which is also the motivation of our work in this paper. But the design of an efficient energy sharing strategy among residents is not easy. In reality, we need to deal with many challenges, including inherent dynamic features of renewable energy, uncertainty of resident electricity usage behavior, periodical electricity price, and so on.
In this paper, we design an online algorithm, which does not need any future statistics and possesses low computational complexity. We aim to minimize the time-average cost in the entire community, and also ensure the electricity usage requirement of each resident. In addition, we also propose a fair revenue division mechanism to incentivize the cooperation among residents. In this paper, our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We formulate the problem as a stochastic constrained problem. The objective is to minimize the time-average cost of residents in a cooperative community by fully exploiting the variety of electricity usage patterns among residents. To this purpose, we propose an online algorithm based on the Lyapunov optimization framework, which can approximate the optimality with explicit bounds.
• We define a revenue division problem for cooperative energy sharing among residents. We propose a highly efficient algorithm based on the Nash bargaining theory, which can guarantee the fairness and optimality of energy sharing in the community.
• By exploiting extensive trace-driven simulations, We validate the efficiency of our algorithm. Compared with noncooperative algorithms, our algorithm can achieve nearly 12% of cost reduction for the community and meet all the residential demands.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we review related work in the field of smart grids. In Section III, we illustrate the system model. Section IV introduces the energy sharing problem formulation and algorithm design based on the Lyapunov optimization. In Section V, we exploit the Nash bargaining theory to formulate the revenue division problem and design the corresponding algorithm as well. Section VI presents the simulation results using real-world traces. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
The problem of energy trading and exchanging in the smart grid has gained lots of research attention recently. Nguyen and Le [6] explored an energy management framework for cooperative microgrids. They employed a two-stage stochastic optimization approach to tackle the uncertainty of renewable energy resources. Lakshminarayana et al. [7] studied the cooperation and storage tradeoffs in the power gird using the Lyapunov optimization technique. Saad et al. [8] explored coalitional game to study the cooperative strategies among microgrids to minimize the costs incurred by the loss of power over the grid lines. Xiao et al. [9] studied a prospect theory-based static game for energy exchanging among microgrids, and the Nash equilibria can be achieved under various scenarios. Wang et al. [10] formulated a noncooperative game among storage units and exploited double auctions to achieve the Nash equilibria.
Another thread of research studied the community-scale smart grids from different aspects. Silva et al. [11] studied the relationship between the size of the group of prosumer (residents are both producer and consumer) and demand forecasting accuracy. They explored Seasonal-Naive method and Holt-Winters algorithms. Lee et al. [12] investigated the cooperation between small-scale electricity suppliers and end-users. They employed the coalitional game method, and proposed an pricing scheme which provides a fair revenue for the participants. Gkatzikis et al. [5] addressed the problem of ''How the storage capacity should be placed and in where'' with respect to a bunch of prosumers that share ESSs collaboratively, and they employed the Nash bargaining theory to share the revenue fairly. Yuan et al. [13] jointly tackled the problem between the distributed energy generation and energy purchasing with a group of cooperative users, and a benefit-sharing optimization problem was proposed and solved as well. A key assumption of [13] is that each energy consumer can predict its energy demand over the whole time horizon accurately, namely, the algorithm needs to have all VOLUME 5, 2017 knowledge about the energy demand profiles of each user from the input. Instead, our algorithm does not require any future statistics about resident energy demand, renewable energy and electricity price. Li et al. [14] considered the energy cost minimization problem in the microgrid with energy selling and plugged in electric vehicles.
Differing from the previous work, our work focuses on two aspects. Firstly, our objective is to optimize the cost of all the residents in a community rather than that of a microgrid [6] - [10] or individual resident [4] , [15] , [16] . In addition, we propose an efficient algorithm to share the revenue fairly among residents based on the Nash bargaining theory. Secondly, while previous works (e.g., [5] , [6] , [13] ) assume the residential load or energy generation parameters (e.g., wind speed) can be accurately forecasted, our algorithm does not need any future statistics about residential energy requirement, renewable energy and electricity price. Hence, our method is more practical and easier to implement.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we would illustrate our system model of a residential community, which is the base of our problem formulation in the next section.
A. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
As shown in Fig. 1 , we consider a cooperative community with energy sharing, in which each resident home has been installed with renewable energy devices and ESSs. The renewable energy devices can harvest solar and wind energy, and the ESS can be charged with energy or discharged. In such a community, all residents can share energy with their neighbors. As illustrated in Fig. 2 , the home controller can collect information (e.g., residential load requirements, harvested energy, ESS energy level) in a resident's home and upload the above information to the central controller. Moreover, the home controller can also conduct scheduling operations according to the energy charging (or discharging) and sharing decisions made by the central controller. The central controller collects information from all residents and enforces a sharing and charging (or discharging) strategy for each resident to minimize the time average cost of the total community. When the total generated renewable energy and required energy are unbalanced, the central controller signals to purchase energy from the main grid.
B. RENEWABLE ENERGY MODEL
Consider a community that has N residents, in which all resident homes are equipped with renewable energy generators. For simplicity, we mainly take two types of renewable energy into consideration in our model:
• Solar Energy. Assume that the harvested solar energy in slot t for resident i is E i s (t), which can be determined by several factors, such as the energy generator's area, the efficiency of transforming energy, and so on. 
From [17], we can define
where A i represents the area of the energy generator for resident i and γ represents the transformation efficiency, while l is the duration of the time slot t and s(t) stands for the strength of sunlight. There is a maximum power point E max s [18] for solar energy regardless of the sunlight strength.
• Wind Energy. Assume that the harvested wind energy in slot t for resident i is E i w (t), which is determined by the area of wind rotor blades, density of the air, and so on. Similarly from [17] , we can define E i w (t) as
where B i represents the area of wind rotor blades for resident i and δ stands for the power coefficient, while ρ is the density of the air, v(t) represents the wind speed in time slot t, l represents the duration of the slot as well.
There is a maximum power point E max w . Intuitively, if the rate of wind is too high, the devices will be damaged. Let E i h (t) denote the total harvest renewable energy in slot t for resident i. We can define the following constraints:
C. ESS MODEL
Let E i r (t) be the energy in the resident i's ESS in slot t. According to [19] , to avoid sulfation, there should be a minimum bound E i rmin , and a maximum capacity of the ESS E i rmax , so we have
It means that the energy at any slot t is in the range of the minimum and the maximum capacity of the ESS. Let E i c (t) and E i d (t) be the charging energy and discharging energy in time slot t, respectively. As in [20] , we do not consider the DC/AC conversion loss as well. So E i r (t + 1) is decided by E i r (t) and charging/discharging operations in slot t, and we obtain
To ease our representation, we adopt two indicator functions as follows:
Without loss of generality, we assume that there only exists one operation in one slot. That is, the ESSs can be either charged or discharged to enhance the consolidation of ESSs simultaneously [21] . Therefore, we can obtain
It means the ESS is in the charging, discharging or idle state. From [22] , let E i cmax and E i dmax be the maximal charging rate and discharging rate respectively, which can represent the upper bounds of charging or discharging rate. Therefore, we can obtain
D. ENERGY SHARING MODEL
Assume that resident i generates E i l (t) energy request at slot t. According to [7] , the energy request can be satisfied in the following two cases:
• The harvested renewable energy is insufficient. In such a situation, the insufficient energy E i l (t) − E i h (t) can be supplied by their neighbors, the ESS and the main grid. Assume resident i can draw E j,i (t) from its neighbor j, E i g (t) represents the energy purchased through the main grid. Recall that the discharging energy is E i d (t), thus we can obtain
• The harvested renewable energy is sufficient. In such a situation, the extra energy E i h (t)−E i l (t) can be distributed to their neighbors, and stored in the ESS. Assume that resident i shares E i,j (t) energy with resident j, recall that the amount of charging energy is E i c (t), thus we can obtain
Since the two situations are exclusive, we can combine the two equations into the following equation:
As energy selling is not considered in this paper, and E i g (t) is bounded due to the electricity line capacity, therefore we have
In addition, the energy sharing balance should be satisfied, thus we can obtain
E. COST MODEL
In our system, we mainly take two types of cost into consideration, namely, the battery cost C i b (t) and electricity cost C i g (t). 1) Battery Cost: For the reason that an ESS (rechargeable batteries) usually has a certain number of operation times, and cost would be incurred during the procurement and maintenance of ESSs. Assume that a certain cost P b would be incurred for each charging or discharging action. Hence, the ESS operation energy cost for resident i in slot t is
2) Electricity Cost: Note that the electricity price from the main grid is dynamic and varies from time to time. The electricity price would be expensive during the electricity peak period and vice versa. Let P g (t) be the price per unit in time slot t. Therefore, we can define the overall electricity cost C i e (t) from the main grid for resident i as
Therefore, we can express the overall cost for resident i in time slot t as
IV. ENERGY SHARING IN A RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY A. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Firstly, we consider a scenario that residents in a community are non-cooperative in energy sharing. In this situation, there is no energy sharing among residents. Therefore, the energy balance equation (9) should be modified as follows:
Recall that the total cost of each resident is C i tol (t) where 1 ≤ i ≤ N , and the objective of this paper is to minimize the time average cost of the entire community with constraints. Based on our system model, the problem can be formulated as follows:
Different from P1, all residents in a cooperative community can share their extra energy with their neighbors. In this case, the problem with energy sharing can be formulated as
The main difference between P1 and P2 is the constraint Eq. (9)(11) (15) . In fact, P1 is a special case of P2 when E i,j (t) = 0, ∀t, ∀i, j. So if we know how to solve P2, P1 will also be solved.
It is challenging to solve P2 for the reason that the future control action would be affected by the current control action, namely Eq. (5)(4). Therefore, we consider a more relaxed problem for P2. LetĒ i c andĒ i d be the time-average expectation when the energy is charging or discharging for resident i using P2's feasible control policy, respectively:
Note that the energy satisfies Eq. (5). We adopt the law of telescoping sums to sum Eq.(5) for all time slot t. Then, we take expectations and we can obtain
Note that the ESS is finite according to Eq.(4). Therefore, we take a division of T over Eq.(18) on both sides and apply limits when T → ∞ yields
Thus we obtainĒ i c =Ē i d . Then a more relaxed problem can be obtained as
B. LYAPUNOV OPTIMIZATION
We adopt y opt to represent the P2's optimal strategy and adopt y rel to represent the P3's optimal strategy. Note that P2 is less constrained than P3, we have y rel ≤ y opt . Based on the Lyapunov optimization method [23] , Lemma 1 can be derived. Proof: The result follows from the Theorem of Optimality over ω-only Policies in the Lyapunov optimization framework [23] , which has been omitted for brevity.
Note that it is possible to characterize and potentially compute such a control policy, but it will violate the constraint Eq.(4) of P2. Nevertheless, the control policy can guarantee the performance for our algorithm.
Note that P3 is a traditional optimization problem and dynamic programming tools can solve it. However, the curse of dimensionality would be incurred and the future knowledge needs to be required. We aim to address the above challenges and explore the Lyapunov optimization method [23] . Therefore, we solve the optimization problem based on the Lyapunov optimization method as below.
Let B(t) be the virtual queue vector, denoted by B(t) = [B 1 (t), B 2 (t), . . . B i (t) . . . , B N (t)], 1 ≤ i ≤ N . The resident i's virtual queue B i (t) can be defined as
The update rule of the virtual queues is designed based on Eq.(5)
Therefore, we define a quadratic Lyapunov function, which aims to measure the virtual queue vector B(t). Then for each slot, we can derive expected change based on the quadratic Lyapunov function.
L(B(t))
Then, we take square action on Eq.(21) and both sides would be divided by 2. Thus, the Lyapunov drift's upper bound can be concluded as 
, and we define
Thus we can obtain
By taking expectation of both sides on Eq. (25) and combining Eq.(23) which represents the Lyapunov drift, we can obtain
According to the Lyapunov optimization method, the driftplus-penalty can be obtained, namely,
By combining Eq.(26)(27), we obtain
We choose a much more greedy method rather than minimizing the drift-plus-penalty. That is, we aim to minimize the right side of the above equation. Thus, We try to solve P4 and the upper bound of the drift-plus-penalty would be minimized.
C. DESIGN OF ONLINE ALGORITHM
Note that P4 represents a linear programming problem. We can solve this problem using existing tools, such as Matlab LP solver, Python Pulp, etc. Thus based on the current system statistics ({E i w (t), E i s (t), E i l (t), P g (t), ∀t, ∀i}), we are able to design an algorithm to calculate the values 
while The system is active do 3: For each time slot t, the current statistics would be collected firstly:
Solving P4 with linear programming solvers to obtain
Update the B i (t)∀i based on Eq. (20) 6:
Update t ← t + 1 7: end while can solve the problem efficiently in the polynomial time.
What is more, we want to explore the optimality and feasibility for our algorithm. To this purpose, Lemma 2 would be proved, which can guarantee Eq.(4).
Lemma 2: Since the resident i's ESS is bounded by the E i rmax , E i rmin , with respect to the virtual queue definition in Eq.(20), B i (t) is bounded for ∀V ∈ [0, V max ], t,
where V max = min i [
, which is adopted to guarantee a reasonable level of ESS energy.
Proof: For simplicity, Appendix A depicts the details of the proof.
Therefore, Theorem 1 can be derived. This theorem can prove the gap, which is between the optimality solution and our proposed CES algorithm.
Theorem 1: (1) Our CES algorithm can obtain control decisions, which would be feasible for P2. (2) Note that y opt represents P2's optimal strategy and we define y a as the time-average value obtained by our CES algorithm. When {E i w (t), E i s (t), E i l (t), P g (t), ∀t, ∀i} are i.i.d over all slots, we can prove that the following inequality is valid:
0 ≤ lim T →∞ y a − lim T →∞ y opt ≤ U V
where V is a tunning parameter and U is a constant. Please refer to Eq.(24) for the details.
Proof: For simplicity, Appendix B depicts the details of the proof.
V. REVENUE DIVISION PROBLEM
Let C nco be the total cost achieved by the optimal solution of P4 in which residents are non-cooperative, and C co be the total cost achieved by the optimal solution of P4 in which VOLUME 5, 2017 residents are cooperative.
tol (t) means the cost associated with resident i with respect to Eq. (14) in a non-cooperative case. Normally, C co < C nco is satisfied for two reasons. On one hand, in the cooperative manner, residents can share their extra energy with their neighbors, so the residents do not need to purchase energy from the grid, which can reduce the total cost. On the other hand, different residents have various electricity usage patterns. For example, some people have extra energy and others lack energy in the morning time, which consequently provides more opportunities of energy sharing and achieves a lower cost.
Though the total cost of a community is lower in the cooperative situation, we need to guarantee that each resident can have a lower cost in the cooperative community as well. Otherwise, residents have no incentive to join the community. To solve this problem, we adopt the Nash bargaining solution for the mechanism design [24] , which can provide optimality and fairness guarantee simultaneously. We use the Nashproduct as the objective function to formulate the revenue division problem as follows:
Recall that E i,j (t) is the energy that resident i shares with resident j, and we define a cost function F i,j (.) to calculate the corresponding energy sharing revenue. The energy sharing cost should be balanced, namely, the constraint
co denote the adjusted total cost for resident i under the cooperative situation over the entire time horizons, and C i nco be the total cost for resident i under the non-cooperative situation over the entire time horizons. Besides, C i co must be no greater than C i nco , otherwise resident i wouldn't join the community.
In the above problem, C i tol (t),C i tol (t) can be obtained by solving P4. However, it is challenging to solve P5 if we cannot figure out the form of the cost function. The key point is to design cost functions F i,j (.), ∀i, j. Luckily, we have the following property on cost functions.
Lemma 3: If we want to guarantee the optimum for P5, F i,j (.), ∀i, j, which represents the cost, should satisfy the constraint as follows:
For simplicity, Appendix C depicts the details of the proof.
Lemma 3 indicates that the optimal energy sharing cost functions are independent of the specific forms of functions F i,j (.). Then by integrating the above equation into the definition of C i co , we can obtain
The above result provides an easy implementation of the revenue division problem, i.e., residents do not need to record which residents they have shared energy with in slot t, and the total cost they reduced is equal to the
. With this insight, the Nash bargaining process can guarantee its rationale. Namely, the net-revenue division can guarantee the fairness for all residents.
Therefore, based on Lemma 3 and Eq.(32), we are able to design an efficient revenue division algorithm, which is presented in Algorithm 2.
All residents adjusted revenue
Receive adjusted revenue
Pay adjusted revenue tmp i − T −1 t=0 C i tol (t) to central controller 8: end if 9: end for
VI. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we would develop trace-driven simulations to estimate the performance of our algorithm. 
A. SIMULATION SETUP
In our simulations, we retrieve the dynamic price of electricity from the main grid [25] . As Fig. 3 illustrates, the electricity price in one month (from 2/01/2014 to 2/28/2014) is highly dynamic. We discretize time into slots, where each slot corresponds to a 5-minute interval. Let E max g = 15KW, which represents the maximal energy through the main grid in each time slot.
As in [20] , we assume that residents generate the workload, which would satisfy the uniform distribution. In our simulation, there exist 12 residents in the same community. For comparison, we assume that there are 3 kinds of groups in the community.
• Group 1: workload generated by all 12 residents would satisfy U (2, 5) KW.
• Group 2: workload generated by 6 residents would satisfy U (0, 5) KW, while workload generated by the other 6 residents would satisfy U (4, 5) KW.
• Group 3: workload generated by 6 residents would satisfy U (0, 0) KW, while workload generated by the other 6 residents would satisfy U (4, 10) KW. Similar to [26] , we set γ = 20% and δ = 30%, which can represent the energy transformation efficient for solar and wind energy, respectively. For the statistics of solar irradiance and wind speed, that is, s(t) and v(t), we retrieve the dataset from [27] and [28] . Intuitively, Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 4(b) depicts the dynamic characteristic of solar irradiance and wind speed. According to [29] , we set the air density as ρ = 1.2041kg/m 3 . In addition, we set the area as 10m 2 for both wind blades and PV generator.
In our simulations, we set the lower bound and upper bound of energy capacity as E i rmax = 30KW and E i rmin = 0KW for residents in the whole community. In addition, the upper bound of energy changes in each slot would be limited as E i cmax = E i dmax = 2KW. Namely, when operations take place to either charge or discharge the ESSs, the energy changes in the slot could not exceed the upper bound. Besides, each operation would incur P b = 0.0001$ cost.
For comparison with our proposed CES algorithm, two alternative strategies are considered as follows:
• Noncooperative Energy Scheduling (NES) [20] , in which the decision of charging (or discharging) depends on the Lyapunov optimization solution in a noncooperative manner.
• Look-back Energy Scheduling (LBES), which is a heuristic strategy. The actions would observe the statistics of the previous slot and then make decisions for the next slot. For example, if the price of electricity rises in the current slot compared with the previous slot, the ESSs would be discharged. On the contrary, if the price of electricity is lower in the current slot compared with the previous slot, the ESSs would be charged B. COMPARISON OF TIME-AVERAGE COST As Fig. 5 illustrates, we can observe that the algorithms perform distinct time-average cost in Group 1. Note that LBES algorithm performs the worst. We analyze the reason and find that LBES algorithm only adopts a simple heuristic rule and there does not exist energy sharing among community residents. From this figure, we can notice that our CES algorithm performs well when compared with the alternative strategies. Intuitively, our CES algorithm can achieve 11.44% and 21.06% of cost reduction on average when compared with NES, LBES algorithms starting from time slot 1000 (minutes). Insights are that our CES algorithm can manage the ESSs operations and conduct energy sharing with neighbors by fully exploring the dynamic price of electricity over time. The main contribution of energy sharing is that residents can share their abundant renewable energy with their neighbors in some slots. In such cases, their neighbors do not need to purchase extra energy through the main grid. Fig. 6 illustrates time-average costs of different groups when using CES. We can observe the three curves are almost the same, because the total load of the three groups is the same. Fig. 7 presents the time-average cost of different groups under CES and NES in the last slot, and CES can reduce more cost in the unbalanced electricity usage situation. It is reasonable that the more various patterns of electricity usage the community have, the higher the probability of energy sharing would be.
C. IMPACT OF SYSTEM PARAMETERS
To investigate the impact of the parameter V , we conduct some further experiments. As Fig. 8 illustrates, we can obtain different time-average cost when using distinct amount of V . Note that when V = V max , the lowest time-average cost could be obtained, which can be concluded by Theorem 1 as well. What is more, V max is associated with energy capacity E i rmax , which can be derived from Lemma 3. Therefore, we also explore the impacts when using distinct amount of E i rmax . As previous, we assume that E i rmax for all residents are the same. As Fig. 9 illustrates, with the higher energy capacity E i rmax , we can achieve the lower cost. However, the maintenance and the procurement of ESSs would be also costly, which means we should skillfully set an appropriate energy capacity to save cost.
D. REVENUE DIVISION VERIFICATION
To ease our illustration, we verify the RDA with loads of Groups 3. Fig. 10 shows the adjusted revenue for each resident in the community. We can observe the adjusted values of the first 6 residents are negative, and the values of the last 6 residents are positive. Because the first 6 residents generate load that follows U (0, 0) KW, they always share energy with neighbors and have no energy consumption, so their neighbors need to pay for the sharing energy, which causes the situation presented in Fig. 10 . From Fig. 11 , we can observe that the cost of each resident in a cooperative community (CES-Cooperative) is much lower than that in the noncooperative community (CESNoncooperative). As the revenue for each resident is the same, the fairness of our algorithm can be verified.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper investigates the energy sharing problem in a cooperative community powered by renewable energy. We propose an online dynamic optimization algorithm called CES with low computational complexity based on the Lyapunov optimization technique to solve the total time-average cost minimization problem. In addition, we also design the RDA algorithm to provide a fair revenue division based on the Nash bargaining theory in order to incentivize the cooperation among residents. By conducting real-trace driven simulations, our proposed CES algorithm could obtain much lower cost than that of other algorithms, and the fairness of RDA is also verified. In the future, we plan to consider more energy trading scenarios in our model and study how the main grid should interact with residents to achieve more efficient energy usage.
APPENDIX

A. PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Proof: We employ the mathematical induction to conclude this Lemma. Firstly, when the time slot t = 0, all the constraints would be guaranteed obviously, because E i rmin ≤ E i r (0) ≤ E i rmax . By combining with (20) , it yields
Assume that the property holds for t = k, i.e,
we prove that all the constraints would be satisfied when t = k + 1 as well. We firstly prove that (29) is satisfied when t = k + 1. When B i (t) ≥ −VP g (t), we can prove E i c (t) = 0. According to (6) , (7) and (21), we can obtain
As B i (t) < −VP g (t), we can prove that E i d (t) = 0 referring to (21), we have
cmax . Based on the definition of V max , we can derive
Thus the proof for (29) is completed. As for (30), when B i (t) < −VP g (t), we have E i d (t) = 0. According to (6) , (7) and (21), we know that B i (t + 1) = B i (t) + E i c (t). Thus
If B i (t) ≥ −VP g (t), we have E i c (t) = 0, and by combining with (21), we have
dmax . Therefore, the proof for (30) is completed.
B. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: Firstly, the feasibility would be concluded. Note that the values produced from our CES algorithm would satisfy all the constraints in P4. Therefore, what we want to prove is that these values also guarantee the constraints for P2 as well. Concretely, these values should guarantee the constraints (4) and (5 (5) is satisfied, and the feasibility is proved.
Next, the suboptimality of the algorithm would be concluded. The objective of our CES algorithm aims to minimize (28) with the right hand side. The algorithm would greedily explore all control policies. The policies lie in Lemma 1, which can guarantee that the policy is randomized, optimal and stationary. Considering the control decisions refer to the stationary, randomized strategy in (28), we can obtain (B(t)) + V E{ 
Taking iterated expectation on above equation with both sides, we can obtain
Then, we sum the above equation when the time slots evolve, that is, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T − 1. Therefore, we take a division of V with both sides and we can get We know that E{B(0)} and E{B(T −1)} are finite according to (4) , then both sides of the above equation would be divided by taking T → ∞, which yields Therefore, we conclude the result. 
